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A COMMENT ON THE BURGER COURT AND
"JUDICIAL ACTIVISM"*
By ROBERT F. NAGEL
Four members of the present Supreme Court, including the
Chief Justice, were nominated in reaction to the belief that "some of
our judges have gone too far in assuming unto themselves a mandate
: . . to put their social and economic ideas into their decisions." 1 It
is perplexing, therefore, that heavy reliance on the judiciary for social and political decision-making has not moderated in the postWarren Court years. Indeed, dependence on judicial power has be-

come more pervasive and more routine in recent years. Judges are
widely engaged in reforming schools, mental hospitals, prisons, adoption laws, and, now, even the census.$ They decide that homosexual
* The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of John Calotta, a thirdyear student at the Cornell Law School.
1. While campaigning in 1968, President Nixon said, "I think some of our judges have
gone too far in assuming unto themselves a mandate . . . to put their social and economic
ideas into their decisions . . .[and he promised to appoint men] who will interpret the Constitution strictly and fairly and objectively." N.Y. Times, May 22, 1969, at 36, col. 1.When
Chief Justice Burger was nominated, the New York Times noted that "off the bench, [Burger]
has spoken against the liberal activist trend of the Warren Court." Id. at 1, col. 8. Six days
before President Nixon nominated Justice Blackmun, the President said that his nominee must
be a "strict constructionist," which he defined as a man who interprets the Constitution cautiously and narrowly. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1970, at 34, col. 3. When the President nominated
Judge Blackmun, Mr. Nixon's press secretary said that the President "considers Judge Blackmun to be a strict constructionist." Id. at i, col. 1.President Nixon announced the nominations of Justices Powell and Rehnquist in an address to a nationwide television and radio audience. In that address, Mr. Nixon, in describing his criteria for selecting nominees, said that a
nominee "should not twist or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate his personal, political and social views." N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 24, col. 3. Mr. Nixon labeled his nominees "conservatives," but he qualified the term: "But [they are "conservatives"] only in a
judicial, not in a political sense." Id. at col. 4.
2. See generally Mishkin, ,Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WAsH. & LEE L.
REV. 949 (1978); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281 (1976). Even those who claim to see similarities between traditional judicial functions
and the modern functions of federal courts do not claim that similar governmental duties have
long been assumed by the federal courts. See. e.g., Eisenberg & Yeazel, The Ordinary and
Extra-ordinaryin Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).
3. For cases relating to schools, mental hospitals, and prisons, see Mishkin and Chayes,
supra note 2. As to the census, see, e.g., Young v. Klutznick, 49 U.S.L.W. 2235 (E.D. Mich.
1980). As to adoption, see, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).

224

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

partners must be permitted to attend high school dances,' the kind of

treatment that is appropriate for mental patients,6 where students
should attend school even when the effect is to increase racial segregation, 6 that every fifteen prisoners must have one foot of urinal
trough,7 and so on. Like sleepwalkers following some internal vision,
lower federal judges and litigants continue to use judicial power

expansively.
One possible explanation for the growth and consolidation of judicial power is that the changes in the membership of the Court simply did not achieve the announced purpose, that the Supreme Court
remains committed to judicial activism.8 And, at least on occasion,

4. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
5. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa.
1977), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W.
3802 (1980) (No. 79-1414, 1980 term).
6. See Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 100 S. Ct. 716, 721 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
7. Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1976), modified sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Newman v. Alabama,
438 U.S. 915 (1978).
8. I use the terms "activism" and "restraint" somewhat reluctantly. Professor Gunther
once referred to "one more dreary round of vacuous if not mischievous talk about self-restraint
and activism .... " The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues" - A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) (distinguishing A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962)). Although often used to hide imprecision, the term
"judicial activism" does capture some quality that is - judging from its persistence - important in describing reliance on judicial decision-making. In this comment, I use "judicial activism" to indicate a mode of constitutional interpretation that tends to lead to discretionary,
detailed, and pervasive regulation by the judiciary. This is no doubt different from some other
uses of the phrase. "Activism" is sometimes used to suggest political liberalism. Cf.J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980). My use is different since the "liberal" position - as, for
example, on the reach of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause - might call for
reducing dependence on judicial decision-making. Nor do I mean "noninterpretivism," as Ely
and others use the phrase, for it is possible to import into the Constitution a concept (such as
states' rights) that also reduces dependence on federal judicial power. Some have used "activism" to describe the "vigorous" definition of individual rights. But, if articulated and justified
clearly enough to have some principled limit, such a use of judicial power would not fall within
my meaning. See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT - JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 100 (1960). Others use the word to describe "aggressive" policy-making by the courts.
My use is not limited in this way since part of my point is that caution itself can increase
dependence on judicial policy-making. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY - THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

145-46 (3d ed. 1973). 1 focus partly on whether the

decision rests on some convincing authoritative norm but also on whether the decision itself is
capable of generating some norm that can bind in future cases. See Greenawalt, Discretion
and Judicial Decisions: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 359 (1975). My use of the phrase accords with general understanding in that it focuses
on the imaginative or unfettered quality of activist decisions. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-2 (1979 Supplement). It also emphasizes the connection between
such decisions and the relative centrality of judicial decision-making in our political system.
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the Court has been astonishingly bold in its use of power." But a
substantial number of all the Justices have expressed doubts, if not
antipathy, about forms of judicial activism, 0 and these expressions
cannot be dismissed as hypocrisy. In fact, on its whole record, the
Burger Court has attained a general reputation for being at least
9. This boldness has been directly evident in some constitutional interpretations; see,
e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

(1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is also evident across a broad range of issues
where the Court has demonstrated strong partiality to judicial decision-making. Even while
minimizing the importance within prisons of such important constitutional rights as free
speech, the Court has created a new right for prisoners to have "access" to the courts - a
rather plain statement that it is judicial supervision, not constitutional content, that is primary.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). (For a more general and similar argument, see
Mishkin, supra note 2). The Court has held that judges, unlike almost all state and federal
executive officers, are immune from civil rights liability even for intentional or malicious deprivatiori of citizens' constitutional rights. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). See also
Butz v. Economy, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In effect, the
Court held that the uninhibited exercise of the judicial function was so important that in this
important respect judges must be above the fundamental law of the land. See Nagel, Judicial
Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 237 (1979). While construing the Civil
Rights Act narrowly to exclude civil liability for judges, the Court greatly expanded its scope
when the effect was to subject a greater range of officials or of behavior to judicial supervison.
For example, § 1983 was extended to include municipalities in Monell v. New York City Dep't
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); as defendants, they are without even qualified immunity. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980), reh. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2979
(1980). The reach of § 1983 was extended to include violations of federal statutory rights in
Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). These cases cannot be explained merely as judicial deference to the will of Congress. The historical support for these statutory interpretations
is questionable. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2507-21 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1428 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 719-24 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). Furthermore, the Court has also expanded its authority to impose monetary
remedies for civil rights violations even in the absence of any statutory authorization at all.
See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); cf. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 100 S. Ct.
2455 (1980) (inherent power of courts to assess attorneys' fees against opposing counsel). The
inference is inescapable that in these cases and in others the Court perceived the need for
broad judicial authority over the conduct of other governmental officials. E.g., U.S. v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (asserting that the power to construe the Constitution cannot be
shared with executive branch). Such evidence, however, does not fully explain the growth of
dependence on judicial decision-making under the Burger Court. It does indicate, unsurprisingly, that the Supreme Court is inclined to favor judicial decision-making and to view its own
function as central in the constitutional system. But a vital, even central, role for the judiciary
is not inconsistent with restraint and circumspection in the use of power.
10. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 479-525 (1979) (Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (opinion of the Court, which included Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, Stewart, Blackmun, and White, JJ., with Powell, J., concurring);
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856, (1976) (Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
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moderately conservative in its use of power. 1 Moreover, even when
the Court sets itself unequivocally against the expansive use of judicial power in a particular area, litigants calmly return to the courts
and often prevail. For example, in Bell v. Wolfish,' 2 the Supreme
Court stated emphatically and repeatedly that the administration of
jails was for jailers not judges. Even body cavity searches were held
to be a matter within the discretion of jail administrators. 8 Almost
immediately after Bell, a district court struck down restrictions on
visitations to jail inmates by their children.' The lower court did
nod to the Supreme Court - "The ambit of the administrators' discretion. . . may be wide" - but then walked on insistently through
the dark - "but it is not unbounded . . . . The final judgment as to
what is reasonable or not lies here.""5
The extent to which the judiciary continues to be used to solve
all manner of social and political problems is, in short, surprising
and must cause some consternation among the Justices themselves. 16
No doubt there are many explanations. Perhaps, for administrative
or political reasons, the Supreme Court has lost control of the lower
courts.' Perhaps, the evident morality in many judicial reforms the desegregation of schools, the reforms of prisons - legitimizes
and encourages the use of judicial power. It may be that reliance on
the judiciary is simply habitual after centuries of traditionally high
American regard for the judicial process and after years of Warren
Court activism.' Possibly, the great issues raised by the Warren

I1. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 148-49; Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U. L. REy. 1 (1978); Steamer, Contemporary
Supreme Court Directions in Civil Liberties, 92 POL. SCI. Q. 425 (1977); S. WASBY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: FROM THE WARREN COURT TO THE BURGER COURT 40-50, 112-33,

139-62, 167-200 (1976); Bender, The Reluctant Court, 2 Civ. Lis. REv. 86 (Fall 1975). For a
balanced view, see Choper, The Burger Court: Misperceptions Regarding Judicial Restraint
and Insensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 767 (1979).
12.

441 U.S. 520 (1979).

13.

Id. at 559-60.

14.

Valentine v. Englehardt, 474 F. Supp. 294 (D.N.J. 1979).

15. Id. at 301.
16. E.g., Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 100 S. Ct. 716, 720-21
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("It is puzzling that many trial and appellate courts continue to
misapply Green and largely to ignore more recent statements on this issue." ld.).
17. That is, control by the Supreme Court might have been reduced by the size of the
workload or by the number of appointments of lower court judges by President Carter.
18. As to the historical influence of the judiciary on decision-making in the United
States, see A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 83-90 (Heirloom ed. 1966); Dahl,
Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 279 (1957), reprinted in L..LEvy, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME
COURT 105 (1967); Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL.
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Court linger in a way that makes judicial restraint impossible. Or it
may be that the intellectual assumptions underlying a restrained role
were devastated by legal realism.
But here I wish to examine how certain widely-noted characteristics of constitutional adjudication under the Burger Court have,
when taken in combination, the natural consequence of encouraging
dependence on judicial decision-making. These characteristics, which
I will illustrate in later sections, are: first, a tendency to be cautious
and "traditional" in style; and, second, a tendency to be indecisive,
confused, and inconsistent in the use of doctrine. In short, my theme
is that, paradoxically, some of the characteristics of the Burger
Court that are most responsible for its conservative image and for its
poor professional reputation have the effect of encouraging pervasive
regulation by the judiciary and ever-increasing dependence on the
courts.
SOME CONSEQUENCES OF CAUTION

The Burger Court's reputation for restraint is based partly on
some conservative civil rights decisions 1 ' and partly on a series of
decisions that fortified procedural obstacles to bringing suit in federal court.' 0 It is also based on the Court's relatively cautious and
"traditional" style of opinion-writing. The Court often produces narrow decisions that are closely confined by elaborate attention to the
facts of the case, and its "technical" explanations often emphasize
such matters as burden of proof or the procedural posture of the
Sc. REV. 50 (1976). De Tocqueville observed that Americans hold the judiciary in high regard
because they acknowledge that all judicial decisions are based on the Constitution, "the origin
of all authority." A. De Tocqueville, supra, at 85. Mr. Justice Jackson traced Americans'
respect for the Court to its isolation: "The people have seemed to feel that the Supreme Court,
whatever its defects, is still the most detached, dispassionate, and trustworthy custodian that
our system affords for the translation of abstract into concrete constitutional commands." R.
JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

23 (1955).

As to the influence of the Warren Court, Professor Ely, for example, has noted that bold
decisions may intensify judicial power rather than deplete the Court's capital. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 48 (1980). See also Rodell, The Warren Court Stands Its Ground, THE
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, September 27, 1964, at 23, col., 1; J. WEAVER, WARREN: THE
MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA (1967); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 99 (1970) ("But the Justices of the Warren Court place their own bet on the future. .

.

. If the bet pays off

. . .

the Justices will have won everything ....

").

19. E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
20. Foremost among these are the standing cases. See. e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldon, 422
U.S. 490 (1975). For a critical analysis, see Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
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case.2 1

Caution and restraint in the use of power by the Supreme Court
can, of course, liberate lower federal courts to use power with more
abandon. For example, in contrast to the Warren Court, which was
often inclined to exercise moral leadership by the "landmark" decision, the Burger Court is sometimes content to allow the law to develop from below. Some eighteen states now are subject to lower
court orders dramatically restructuring their prisons.2 2 These orders
are based on a novel interpretation of the eighth amendment to the
effect that an institution as a whole can violate the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.2" Reform has been allowed to
proceed across the country without any authoritative ruling by the
Supreme Court on the correctness of this interpretation or of the
accompanying remedial orders.2 4
More importantly, the Burger Court's cautious approach may
have had the effect of discouraging, or postponing, the political
checks that can confine judicial power. A Supreme Court that is
openly aggressive in its use of power provokes responses from the
public or from other institutions of government. The Warren Court,
of course, elicited rumblings about impeachment and various propos21. See text accompanying note 48 infra.
22. See Nelson v. Collins, 455 F. Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978), modified, 588 F.2d 1378
(4th Cir. 1978); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977), affd, 616 F.2d 598
(1st Cir. 1980); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977); Chapman v. Rhodes,
434 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D. Ohio 1977), affid, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir. 1980); Moore v. Janing,
427 F. Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcom, 421
F. Supp. 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aJd,
548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977); Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Ky. 1976); Alberti v.
Sheriff of Harris County, 406 F. Supp. 649 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F.
Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), affd. 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated, 539 F.2d 547 (5th
Cir. 1976), rev'd per curim, 430 U.S. 325 (1976); Bel v. Hall, 392 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mass.
1975); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Johnson v. Lark, 365 F. Supp.
289 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affd, 501 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), vacated, 522
F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1975); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hamilton v. Shiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.
Va. 1971). See also Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1975), modified, 580
F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Barnes v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218
(D.V.I. 1976); Martin Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R. 1976), affd, 551 F.2d
877 (1st Cir. 1977).
23. The doctrine was first enunciated in Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), affid, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
24. There has been, however, some approving dicta. E.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct.
1861, 1886 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). On the role of lower courts in
prison reform, see Fair, The Lower Federal Courts as Constitution-Makers: The Case of
Prison Conditions, 7 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 119 (1979).
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als to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

5

Such political re-

sponses, whether or not carried to completion, can create some sense
of a need for limits even in a court that accepts activism in principle.2 The Burger Court decisions, however, may have had the effect
of deflating some potential opposition by convincing other institutions that the Court is at least reasonably committed to the re-

strained use of power. The Court's desegregation decisions are worth
examining because they suggest how the style and substance of judicial restraint can give way, after disarming potential opposition, to

relatively unrestrained judicial power.
Until 1974, the Burger Court had generally continued the War-

25. Impeachment proposals arose in several states soon after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); N.Y. Times, June 25, 1955, at 15, col. I (Ala.); N.Y. Times, Feb.
22, 1957, at 35, col. 2 (Ga.). Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, appearing on nationwide television, characterized the Court as "a great menace to this country," and called for
the impeachment of the Justices who had backed decisions that he said "curtailed the anticommunist campaigns of Congress and the Government." N.Y. Times, July 8, 1957, at 15, col.
5.
Decisions on anti-sedition laws also elicited political responses. The most serious Congressional efforts were embodied in two 1958 bills: H.R. 3 and S.2646, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1958). Congress and the Nation 1945-1965, 1965 CONG. Q. 1442. H.R. 3 would have established two new rules governing application of the preemption doctrine: (a) federal laws were to
be construed as intended to invalidate state laws only if Congress had stated specifically that it
wished to preempt a field of legislation between a state law and a federal law; and (b) existing
federal laws should not be construed as indicating congressional intention to bar states from
passing laws punishing sedition. S.2646, the Jenner-Butler bill, would have provided: (a) that
no past or future federal anti-sedition law should be construed by the courts as prohibiting
enforcement of otherwise valid state anti-sedition laws; (b) that each of the two chambers of
Congress was the final judge of whether questions put to witnesses by its committees were
pertinent to the authorized purpose of the committee inquiry; (c) that a person being tried for
contempt of Congress for refusing to answer questions before a congressional committee could
not argue in defense that the questions were not pertinent unless he had raised the issue of
pertinency at the time the questions were asked; and (d) that the 1940 Smith Act made all
teaching and advocacy of forcible overthrow of the United States Government a crime.
By 1964, the school prayer decision had provoked a political response, including a proposal to amend the first amendment of the Constitution to allow prayer and Bible reading in
public schools. The purpose of the prayer resolution was to overturn two Supreme Court decisions, Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp,.
374 U.S. 203 (1963), Congress and the Nation 1945-1965, 1965 CONG. Q. 1675. During the
88th Congress, 149 resolutions proposing constitutional amendments to reverse the Court's
decisions were introduced and sent to the House Judiciary Committee. Id.
After Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),
opponents proposed a constitutional amendment to restrict their impact. The most prominent
proposal provided: "Nothing in the Constitution of the United States shall prohibit a state
having a bicameral legislature from apportioning the membership of one house of the legislature on factors other than population if the citizens of the state shall have the opportunity to
vote upon the apportionment." Congress and the Nation 1945-1965, 1965 CONG. Q. 1526-27.
26. For an account of how the reaction to the desegretation decisions affected one Justice, see G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 297-326, 347-52 (1977).
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ren Court's support for broad lower court authority to fashion desegregation remedies."7 Between 1974 and 1977, Congress actively considered a large number of anti-busing measures - by one count,
twenty-five bills and twenty-nine constitutional amendments in 1975
alone.' During this same period the Court's decisions demonstrated

27. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
28. Kirp, School Desegregation and the Limits of Legalism, 47 THE PUBLIC INTEREST
101, 117 (1977). On August 7, 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, Education Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380, 88
Stat. 484 (amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-41). The busing amendments of the bill provided the
most controversy during the Senate-House conference. The House had adopted an amendment
which flatly prohibited the busing of any child beyond the school closest to his home and which
allowed all previous court busing orders to be reopened and brought into compliance with that
prohibition. When it sent the bill to conference, and twice during the conference, the House
instructed its conferees to insist on the House busing provisions. Furthermore, President Nixon
had threatened to veto a bill without the House busing restriction. The Senate, however, had
rejected an amendment identical to the House provision by only one vote. The Senate passed
an amendment declaring that no child should be bused beyond the school closest to his home,
but allowed courts to order more extensive busing if it were required to guarantee a student's
civil rights. The House-Senate conferees finally settled on provisions similar to the Senate version. See 1974 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 441
The other major legislative activity involving school busing in 1974 occurred when Congress passed the bill making fiscal year 1975 appropriations for the Department of Labor and
for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Appropriations - Labor and Health,
Education and Welfare Departments, Pub. L. No. 93-517, 88 Stat. 1634 (1974). On November 26, 1974, Congress passed the bill, which contained provisions prohibiting the expenditure of federal funds for the purpose of busing students to achieve racial desegregation. The
amendments prohibited the use of, or the withholding of, federal funds to force any school
district already desegregated (1) to bus school children; (2) to abolish schools; or (3) to require
students to attend any school against the wishes of their parents. See 1974 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 97.
On September 23, 1975, the House adopted an anti-busing amendment for the Energy
Conservation and Oil Policy Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-163, 88 Stat. 871. The amendment was
phrased in terms of conserving fuel by preventing unnecessary transportation; and it prohibited
the use of any gasoline or diesel-powered vehicle to transport children, other than one's own, to
a public school farther from his home than the appropriate grade school within his school
district. In conference, however, the anti-busing amendment was deleted from the final version
of the bill. See 1975 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 239.
Also in 1975, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia introduced a new anti-busing amendment to the Labor and Health, Education and Welfare Departments appropriations bill (H.R.
8069, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)) which barred HEW from ordering that any student be
bused beyond his neighborhood school. The amendment, which passed both houses, is significant because its passage marked the first time that the Senate joined the House and the President in opposing busing. Id. at 641.
Further major activity over the issue of busing occurred before Congress passed the second supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal year 1975 (Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. ' 94-32, 89 Stat. 173). By a voice vote, the House passed an
amendment to prohibit any funds in the bill from being used either to transfer teachers or to
bus school children against the wishes of the student's parents, as a condition for receiving
federal funds, or to overcome racial imbalance or carry out a desegregation plan. Id. at 771.
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substantial concern about the implications of applying nationwide
the judicial remedies developed during the desegregation struggle in
the south. In Milliken v. Bradley 2 9 the Court disapproved an interdistrict busing remedy despite the lower court's finding that omitting the suburbs from the desegregation plan would "lead directly to
a single segregated . . . school district [in Detroit] overwhelmingly
black in all of its schools." 8 0 This aspect of the Milliken opinion
raised the radical prospect that federal judicial power would be limited - out of concern for local control over schools
to something
less than might be necessary to redress constitutional violations
fully. 1
Later opinions, although always ambiguous, buttressed this possibility. In Pasadena v. Spangler, 2 the Court held that judicial
power over a school district ended when appropriate racial balance
was achieved, even if the district' was in danger of re-segregating..
-

In 1976, anti-busing pressure affected the consideration of a major bill on federal aid to
higher and vocational education programs (Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-482,
90 Stat. 2081 (amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-41)). See 1976 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 576.' Notable
during this period was President Ford's legislative proposal to restrict court-ordered busing, the
"School Desegregation Standards and Assistance Act of 1976." The legislation would have set
guidelines and time limits for busing orders and established a national advisory committee to
assist school systems in desegregating voluntarily. Id. at 594.
In the fiscal year 1977 appropriations bill for the Department of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare (H.R. 14232, 95th Cong., ist Sess. (1977)), Congress inserted the same
anti-busing provisions as in H.R. 8069, the appropriations bill for 1976. Id. at 792. In 1977
Congress took two additional actions that involved opposition to busing: the Senate reported
the first bill from a congressional committee that sought to restrict the authority of federal
courts to order busing; and Congress moved further in the direction of restricting the use of
HEW funds for busing. 1977 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 450. The Senate Judiciary Committee, by
an 11 to 6 vote, reported a bill (S. REP. No. 443, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1977)) that would
have restricted the circumstances under which federal courts could order busing for school
desegregation. Id. at 510. The bill would have applied to cities in which busing orders had
been handed down but could still be appealed, and to cities where all appeals had been exhausted but where buses had not actually started rolling. In the latter cases, the cases would
be reopened and brought into compliance with the new bill. Committee members opposed to
the bill listed sixty school districts in which ongoing school desegregation litigation would be
affected by the bill. Id. Congress took no further action on the bill in 1977. Also, in 1977,
Congress moved further in the direction of restricting the use of HEW funds for busing. Id. at
450. Congressional opponents of busing claimed that HEW had found a loophole in the appropriations bill barring the use of federal funds to require the transportation of any student to a
school other than the one nearest his home which offered the courses he wanted. Id. Congress
broadened the restriction by also barring the use of funds for pairing or clustering of schools of
different racial compositions with each school serving all children in a specified set of grades.
Id. at 298.
29. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
30. Id. at 743.
31. Id. But see id. at 744-45.
32. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
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Again, the Court relied on the need not to displace local decisionmakers unnecessarily."8 In a 1977 case, Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman, 4 the Court held that a court could not order a systemwide desegregation remedy within an urban boundary unless it found
that the incremental segregative effects of the official misconduct
were system-wide. The Court reasoned that allowing a lower court to
control vital education programs merely because such control might
be helpful in redressing a constitutional violation could improperly
impair the authority of state and local governments.85 The Court acknowledged the traditional power of courts to redress constitutional
violations by arguing that the threat to local authority would be kept
within acceptable limits if judicial remedies corrected only the segregation actually caused by the official segregative acts.36 Thus the
Court seized on the need to prove causality - the amount of segregation caused by the constitutional violation - as the effective limit
on the authority of lower courts to control local education.
Although its desegregation decisions did not invariably restrain
the power of lower courts,8 7 the Court's concern through 1977 was
unmistakable: federal judicial power should be limited..by some concern for the authority of state and local governments. From 1977,
the year of the last of the restrictive Burger Court decisions, until
the 1980 presidential election, Congress presented a much less immediate threat to judicial power over desegregation. The number of
anti-busing bills introduced dropped sharply and none passed.88 Of
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 433.
97 S.Ct. 2766 (1977).
Id. at 2770, 2772-74.
Id. at 2770.
See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).

38. During 1978, the debate over busing involved an attempt by Delaware Senators William V. Roth, Jr. and Joe Biden to attach to the Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95561, 92 Stat. 2143 (amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-41), the text of S. 1651. S. 1651 sought to
restrict the court's authority to order busing as a remedy in desegregation cases. S.1651 was
never brought to the floor because pro-busing senators threatened a filibuster. 1978 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 566-67. The same threat was made during the debate over the Roth-Biden amendment on August 23, 1978. Id. The floor manager of ESEA, Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., eventually
moved to table the Roth-Biden amendment, which killed it. The tabling motion narrowly
passed, 49 to 47. On June 7, 1979, the Senate tabled an amendment by Jesse Helms, R-N.C.,
to prohibit busing during an energy emergency. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 35 CoNG.

Q. 381 (1979). Senator Helms attempted to attach an anti-busing amendment to the Civil
Rights Commission Authorization Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-81, 93 Stat. 642 (amending 42
U.S.C. 1975). Id. The Helms amendment (S.J. Res. 13, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) which

prohibited court-ordered or voluntary busing during an energy emergency, was tabled by a
vote of 49 to 46. Id.
Two anti-busing proposals emerged in the House. First, busing opponents attached an
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course, it is difficult to know the precise extent to which the Court's
restrictive decisions contributed to this decline in legislative activity.
It is suggestive that Milliken v. Bradley was apparently a "key factor" in defeating the anti-busing position on at least one early bill. 3 '
Aside from the effect of the decisions on specific legislative outcomes, it does not seem unlikely that the restrained position of the
Supreme Court might have been indirectly influential by reducing
the intensity or effectiveness of public opposition to busing.' 0
Whatever the extent of judicial influence, at least one major
congressional opponent of busing had conceded by 1979 that the issue was dead until after the presidential election. 1 In that same
year, the Supreme Court broke a lengthy silence on desegregation by
issuing two important desegregation opinions. Both substantially undercut the restrictions that the Court had earlier announced in its
effort to protect local governments from overreaching by federal district courts. In a second Dayton decision' 2 and in Columbus Board
amendment to the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. 96-88, 93 Stat. 688
(1979). The amendment (H.R.J. Res. 129, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979)) would have barred
the department from requiring a school district, as a condition of receiving federal funds, to
bus students to achieve racial balance. Id. at 471. On June 11, 1979 the provision was adopted
by the House after a 227-135 vote, but was dropped in conference. Id. at 465, 471.
Busing opponents did succeed in bringing an anti-busing constitutional amendment
(H.R.J. Res. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) to a vote on the House floor for the first time.
Id. at 482-84. The amendment not only fell short of the required two-thirds majority of members present and voting, but it failed to win the approval of even a simple majority of the
House. Id. at 482. The vote was 209 for the amendment, and 216 against. Id. Ronald M.
Mottl, D-Ohio, who led the amendment drive, conceded that the defeat meant that the issue
was dead - at least until after the 1980 election. The next Congress might be "more conducive" to an amendment drive, he speculated. id. at 483.
Neither chamber of Congress entertained anti-busing proposals during early 1980. See
[1979-1980] 1-2 CONGRESSIONAL INDEX (CCH). It appears likely, of course, that anti-busing
measures will be revived in 1981. My point here is merely that the Court's position on desegregation through 1977 appears to have decreased political opposition between 1977 and 1980.
See note 39 infra.
39. During the debate over the final version of The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (see note 28 supra), Congress discussed Milliken. Busing opponents believed
that the decision might persuade "many members . . . to vote for [the weaker restrictions in]
this Conference Report" and argued that Miliken did not go far enough to restrict forced
busing. 120 CONG. REC. 26114-15 (1974). Congressman Landgrebe even argued that the Supreme Court's timing suggested an intention to influence the deliberations in the House. Id.
The House, which before Milliken had approved a strict anti-busing provision, voted 323 to 83
after Milliken to accept the less restrictive Senate version. Congressional observers described
the Court's decision as a "key factor" in dissipating opposition to the conference agreement on
school busing. 1976 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 473. See 120 CONG. REC. 26103-28 (1974).
40. See generally Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 50 (1976).
41. See note 38 supra.
42. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman., 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
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of Education v. Penick4 8 the Court upheld lower court orders that
required the reassignment of almost half of a district's 96,000 stu-

dents, the busing of 15,000 students, the massive reassignment of
teachers and administrators, the reorganization of grade structures,
and the closing of thirty-three schools. As a dissenter remarked,
"Local and state legislative and administrative authorities have been

supplanted or relegated to initiative-stifling roles as minions of the
44
courts."
More unusual than these intrusions into local self-government
was the Supreme Court's obscure but far-reaching explanation. The
Court justified the remedies essentially on the basis of the failure of
school officials affirmatively to achieve racial balance after 1954, and
not on the need to redress the effects of their segregative acts. This
justification is obscure partly because the Court insisted that it was
not in fact breaking any new ground. It ostensibly based its decisions
on the fact that officials had engaged in recent acts that had systemwide segregative impact. 5 But these "acts" consisted mainly of the
failure of school officials to take affirmative steps to achieve racial
balance., 6 - a failure that could not have been illegal itself since
officials are not under a duty to achieve racial balance unless they
caused the imbalance to begin with.
The Court's effort to appear consistent with prior cases led it to
approve findings that strain credibility to the limit. In one of the
cases, school officials had been found to have segregated four elementary schools and one junior high school prior to 1954. Twentyfive years later, the school system consisted of 172 schools, most of
which had not existed at the time of these initial segregative acts.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court traced current racial imbalance
throughout the system to the initial segregation of those five
schools. 4 7 The Court explained this remarkable causal nexus by creating legal "presumptions" and by shifting the burden of proof.' 8
The use of these devices makes it difficult to know whether the Court
was altogether abandoning the requirement that desegregation remedies compensate only for the racial imbalance shown to have been
caused by segregative acts. But this requirement, so recently and
painfully constructed in an effort to protect local authority over edu43. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

487 (Powell, J.,dissenting).
461-67.
502-04 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
505-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
467-68.
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cation, was certainly rendered inconsequential in these cases.
The contrast to the overt assertions of moral authority common
in the famous Warren Court decisions is stark. The potentially
sweeping nature of these Burger Court decisions is not readily apparent and not altogether certain. Complex explanations earnestly
claim consistency with prior case law. Legalistic style which suggests
traditional judicial caution is used to approve potentially large increments in judicial power. At least in comparison to more sweeping,
Warrenesque pronouncements, the style of these two most recent decisions will add less to the intensity of the political opposition to the
continued involvement of the judiciary in local education.
Although those not privy to the Court deliberations cannot be
certain, these confusing but potentially far-reaching decisions may
have been prompted in part by the Justices' perception that congressional opposition to busing had fallen off and was unlikely to be effective in the immediate future.4 If the Justices were not aware of
legislative activity, they ignored "an appropriate and important way
for the political branches to register disagreement with the
[Court].'

On the other hand, if the Justices did feel somewhat

freer by 1979 to delegate enhanced power to lower federal courts,
they were responding to their own influence to the extent that their
earlier, restrictive decisions had been a factor in reducing congressional concern. Thus the Supreme Court's cautious style and conservative reputation can have -

at least temporarily -

the effect of

protecting and enhancing the autonomy and power of the lower
courts.
49. Justice Marshall, at least, suggested that the intense anti-busing pressures that existed in 1974 influenced the Court to restrict lower court authority in Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 812-15 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is no less plausible that an easing of this
pressure might have had the opposite effect on the Court.
50. P. BATOR, P. MIsHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973), quoted in J. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 53 (10th ed. 1980).
51. This effect is not necessarily confined by some special concern for the issue of school
desegregation. Recently, in an effort to protect Indian treaty rights, the Court approved a
plenary effort by a lower court to regulate salmon fishing in Washington State. There was no
serious consideration of the preservation of local decision-making, the issue that just two years
earlier had tormented the Court's desegregation decisions. See Washington v. Fishing Vessel
Assn., 443 U.S. 658 (1979). In its brief discussion of the issue, the Court labeled as "absurd"
the argument that the district court might not have power to take over the state administrative
operations. Id. at 695. "The federal court unquestionably has the power. . . to displace local
enforcement .... .. Id. (Emphasis added.)
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INCONSISTENCY AND POWER

The recent desegregation cases demonstrate more consensus on
the need to delegate substantial power to lower courts than on the
nature of the underlying constitutional right at stake. 2 In other areas as well, the Burger Court has been uncertain in its interpretations of the Constitution. Indeed, the reputation of the Court within
the legal profession is miserable." Lawyers, judges, and scholars
point sarcastically and sometimes hopelessly to the bewildering
proliferation of concurring and dissenting opinions5' and to the apparently inexplicable reversals of tone and reasoning.5 5 Despair over
the Court's performance seems to be shared by the Justices themselves, who use extreme rhetoric and invective to accuse each other
6
of all manner of sins.

52. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 239 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Strickman, School Desegregation at the Crossroads, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 725 (1975).
53. 1leave it to the reader to assess whether this impression is widespread, but the literature certainly contains indications that criticism is serious and broadly based. See, e.g.,
Choper, The Burger Court: Misperceptions Regarding Judicial Restraint and Insensitivity to
Individual Rights. 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 767 (1979); Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80
YALE L. J. 1198 (1971); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L. J. 920 (1973); Michelman, States' Right and States' Roles: Permutations of 'Sovereignty' in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J. 1165 (1977); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 169.
54. E.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (majority
opinion, five concurring opinions, and a dissenting opinion); California v. Minjares, 443 U.S.
916 (1979) (a seven-page dissent from the denial of a stay of mandate pending disposition of a
petition for a writ of certiorari); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (a
majority opinion with five separate concurring and/or dissenting opinions).
55. Compare Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 521
(1979); or compare Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) with Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974); or compare Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) with National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and with City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); or compare University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) with Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980); or compare Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) with Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978); or compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) with Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); or compare Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) and Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976) with Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); or compare Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979) with Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
See also notes 60-64 infra.
56. In his dissent in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 579, Justice Marshall described the
majority opinion as "bankrupt" and "unthinking." In University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438
U.S. at 408 n.1, Justice Stevens wrote: "Four members of the Court have undertaken to announce (in an opinion that concurs in part and dissents in part] the legal and constitutional
effect of this Court's judgment. . . . It is hardly necessary to state that only a majority can
speak for the Court or determine what is the 'central meaning' of any judgment of the Court."

1981]

"JUDICIAL ACTIVISM"

The Burger Court is not, of course, the first court to vacillate in
its constitutional interpretations. And some commentators go to
great lengths to find harmony under the cacophony.5 7 I am not concerned here with the extent to which the apparent inconsistencies in
Burger Court decisions are ultimately unprincipled or unjustifiable. I
note the fractured and uncertain quality of its constitutional interpretation only to focus on the effects of doctrinal confusion on the
exercise of judicial power. The Court's inability to maintain agreement about constitutional meaning does not, as one might expect, 8
reduce judicial influence. In important ways, the uncertainty and inconsistency have enhanced judicial power.
An obvious consequence of doctrinal inconsistency is to reduce
the Supreme Court's capacity to control lower courts. Aware that
even emphatic language in one decision might be distinguished or
disregarded in the next, lower courts are encouraged to ignore
whatever suggestions of restraint might emerge from the Supreme
Court. The first time that both the Detroit and Dayton desegregation
cases reached it, the Burger Court issued stern instructions on the
need to respect the need for local control over education.5 9 In both
cities, lower courts persevered. The second time these cases reached
the Court, they resulted in expansive language approving broad judicial control over city schools. 60
More fundamentally, inconsistency in the use of principle discourages efforts to formulate principles. In 1968, the Court ruled
that discrimination against illegitimates would be subject to "careful
judicial scrutiny," a test that requires that state statutes be struck
down unless they can be justified by a "compelling state interest." 61
In 1971, it switched to the "rational basis" test, which requires that
the statute be upheld unless it can be shown to be unrelated to any
legitimate state interest. 61 In 1972, it moved back to the "strict scruSee also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
57. E.g., Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979); Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects under
the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1977).
58. See note 18 supra.
59. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410, 418-20 (1977); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-44 (1974).
60. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 (1977).
61. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
62. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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tiny" standard for judging discrimination against illegitimates.65 In
1977, the Court settled on a "middle-level" of review, the nature of
which was somewhat mysterious except that it was described as "not
toothless.""
This pattern is not unique. The same inconsistency and the
same eventual adoption of a middle level of review can be found in
other areas, notably discrimination by gender." The progression is
perfectly understandable, for inconsistencies in the use of doctrine
are an embarrassment. Therefore, the inconsistent use of doctrine
encourages the substitution of a less specific "test" that can always
be used and avoids the appearance of inconsistency. Such a test does
not emphasize categorical judgments based on principle but the
highly contextual evaluation of facts: the importance of the specific
governmental purpose asserted, the empirical justification for the
policy, and the degree of harm to the class discriminated against."
Thus, the Court turns comfortably from disagreements about principle to narrow agreement based on situationally-defined values. The
Court cannot tell in general whether women should be given the
same degree of protection as blacks under the equal protection
clause. 7 But it can agree on the amount of empirical data required
to justify a state's judgments that young men present a greater danger of drunk driving than do young women. s The Court cannot
agree on the principles to be applied in evaluating the use of racial
preference in educational admission programs.69 Hence, in its later
consideration of the use of racial preference in the Public Works
Employment Act, a plurality of the Court explicitly denied relying

63. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
64. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
65. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347
(1979) (sex discrimination invalid if based on administrative convenience or outmoded
cliches); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 890 (1978); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (discrimination against men reviewed under a middle standard
that required a substantial relationship to an important governmental interest); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (discrimination against men reviewed under rationality standard); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion reviewed discrimination against women under strict scrutiny standard); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (discrimination against women reviewed under rationality standard).
66. For an early - and supportive - description of this trend, see Gunther, Forward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).

67. Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973).
68. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
69. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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on any of the "formulas of analysis articulated in such cases
as. . . Bakke."' 0 Instead, apparently exhausted with the painful
search for principle, the plurality emphasized a close evaluation of
the specifics of the Act. Values are sought in the situation when they
cannot be found in the Constitution.
The Burger Court is not unique because it devotes close attention to facts, for, indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a useful role for
judges that excludes such attention. Nor is it the first Supreme
Court to "explain" a result by assessing (or "balancing") the factors
involved. 71 And the Court has not abandoned doctrine altogether; all
are on notice, for example, that sex discrimination must be justified
by an "important" rather than "compelling" governmental interest.72
But the doctrines chosen increasingly emphasize close attention to
facts and the explanations offered frequently do little more than
state the Court's assessments of those facts.
This tendency, so readily apparent in equal protection cases, is
becoming widespread. Consider, for example, two separation of powers cases, United States v. Nixon (Nixon 1)78 and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Nixon 11). 7 1 In 1974, in Nixon L the
Court recognized a constitutionally based presidential privilege to
withhold records of private conversations from the judiciary. The
privilege was inferred from the nature and function of the office,7 5
and a presidential claim for confidentiality was held to be presumptively valid. 76 The presumption was overcome only by the judiciary's
need for a limited number of itemized conversations relevant to a
criminal trial. In 1977, in Nixon II, the Court upheld a statute that
provided for the storage and screening of huge quantities of presidential conversations by an archivist and for the eventual promulga77
tion of regulations for the release of the information to the public.
In Nixon I, the Court denied that the congressional regulation of
the presidential records even presumptively conflicted with executive
functions. Instead, the Court required a factual demonstration of ac-

70. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2781 (1980).
71. For a history, see Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1022 (1978).
72. See note 67 supra.
73. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
74. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
75. 418 U.S. at 714-16.
76. Id. at 708.
77. There were forty-two million pages of documents and 880 tape'recordings. 433 U.S.
at 430.
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tual "potential for disruption" before engaging in a weighing of the
two interests."8 Moreover, the weighing process in Nixon H emphasized not a competing institutional interest, but the Court's assessment of the "importance" and "substantiality" of the public interest
served by the statute (described as "the American people's ability to
reconstruct and come to terms with their history" 7 9). While both
cases used a balancing test, the approach taken in Nixon H was less
structured; the Court described it as a "pragmatic, flexible approach." 80 The author of Nixon I dissented, finding it "very disturbing that fundamental principles of constitutional law are subordinated to what seem the needs of a particular situation." 8'
There are other significant indications that the Burger Court is
increasingly willing to substitute the evaluation of facts for constitutional meaning. When does the first amendment permit patronage
dismissals? When a specific inquiry convinces a court that "party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance of
the public office." 82 When is the death penalty not cruel and unusual
punishment? As Justice Burger himself recently wrote, when "on a
case-by-case basis [the Court decides] a defendant's conduct is egregious enough to warrant a death sentence."8 " When do anti-picketing statutes not violate the Equal Protection Clause? When "there is
an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.'
If, as a matter of degree, the Burger Court's doctrinal inconsistencies and disagreements are pushing the Court towards greater reliance on the analysis and evaluation of facts, the consequence for
the exercise of judicial power is to increase discretion. To the extent
that opinions turn on descriptions of the specific facts of the case or
on weighing multiple factors, they tend not to "reach out beyond the
78. The Court first asserted that there was no conflict with presidential power since the
General Services Administration was within the executive branch. 433 U.S. at 441. The Court
then argued that, "in any event," the President was required to show a potential for disruption.
Id. at 441-43. Given the extensive records involved, it is hard to imagine what the Court meant
to require. Compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, where the Court described the
material to be disclosed as "precisely identified" and "a limited number of conversations."
79. 433 U.S. at 452-53.
80. Id. at 442.
81. 433 U.S. at 505 (1977) (Burger, J., dissenting).
82. Branti v. Finkle, 100 S. Ct. 1287, 1295 (1980).
83. Godfrey v. Georgia, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting).
84. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). For an example of how
this standard requires highly particularized evaluation of facts, see Carey v. Brown, 100 S. Ct.
2286 (1980).
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narrow circumstances of the case

. .

. [and] the reasoning gives lit-

8
tle or no guidance as to how related situations would be treated."
In short, judges are permitted to assess situations but are not required to announce principles. Cautious, narrowly-based opinions are
liberating judges from the constraint of formulating and applying
meaning derived from some source other than the facts of the case.
The inconsistent use of doctrine and the resulting increment in
judicial discretion encourage litigants of all types to try their hand at
constitutional adjudication. When a court holds to a clear principle
- even if that principle allows for the exercise of great power within
its limits - at least some claims are discouraged because it is obvious to all that they do not fall within that principle. But if the
Court's judgment as to what triggers heightened solicitude is always
changing or if almost every case is resolved by an ad hoc assessment
of "reasonableness," no certain message is ever conveyed. All groups
and interests are encouraged by the unconfined potential for judicial
action to commit their resources to judicial resolution of their
problems.
DISCRETION AND REGULATION

Although narrow holdings based on specific facts fit well with
the Court's apparently cautious and traditional style, the consequence for the substance of judicial work is to expand judicial power.
The use of situationally-defined values to provide constitutional
meaning not only increases judicial discretion, but also results in a
"constitution" that is both highly detailed and pervasive. A vast
range of subjects tends to become subject to judicial regulation.
The cumulative effect of many limited decisions is code-like detail. The tendency for the Court to write such codes is illustrated by
a series of cases dealing with the right to trial by jury. In Williams
v. Florida,86 the Court went out of its way to avoid a clear-cut, decisive method for determining whether a jury must contain twelve
members. It rejected the clear historical meaning of the word "jury"
to hold that reducing the traditional membership of twelve to six was
permissible in state felony trials.8 7 The Court asserted that the
proper inquiry was whether any particular number of jurors could be
85. See Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 982, 987-88, 996 (1978).
86. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
87. The majority conceded that the "usual" expectation of the framers might have been
that juries would consist of twelve individuals, id. at 98, and that this meaning had been
entrenched since the fourteenth century. Id. at 89.
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shown empirically to be essential to the functioning of a jury.88 Having committed the constitutional definition of "jury" to the evaluation of specific data on jury functioning, the Court soon had to determine whether unanimous verdicts were "essential" to that
functioning. 89 Then, of course, the Court had to face the issue
whether unanimous verdicts were essential to the operation of sixmember juries, 90 and, inevitably, whether five-member juries were
permissible."
Similarly, the Court's enunciation of a constitutional right of
privacy in the famous abortion case 92 depended upon a situationallydefined accommodation between the specific interests of the state
and individual. The importance of the state's interest in protecting
potential human life, for example, depended on the specific trimester
of pregnancy in which that interest was asserted.9' The variable nature of the "right" meant that the state might control its exercise in
an indeterminate range of potential situations. Consequently, the
Court had to assess whether the state could require that abortions be
performed in specially accredited hospitals and whether states could
require the approval of a special committee or the concurrence of
two physicians." Then the Court had to face the question whether a
state could require the written consent of the woman undergoing the
abortion.' 5 Were record-keeping requirements consistent with the
right to privacy, and, if so, what, sort of records? 96 Was the prohibition of saline abortions constitutional? 97 Was a parental consent statute for girls under the age of eighteen constitutional?'" If not, could
parental consent be required at any age?"9 Could minor girls be required to notify or consult with a parent before going to court to
prove knowing consent to an abortion? 10 0
The ad hoc evaluation of facts not only increases the detail of

88. Id. at 86, 99-103.
89. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
90. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
91. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
92. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. Id. at 164-65.
94. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
95. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
99. The answer, apparently, like so many answers of the Burger Court, is that the
proper age can be decided only by courts on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 643 n.23.
100. Id.

1981]

"JUDICIAL ACTIVISM"

judicial regulation, but also enlarges the range of issues to which the
Constitution is thought to apply. 10 1 This is because, perversely, the
values that emerge from ad hoc assessments of factual circumstances
tend to be highly generalized. Without the organizing structure that
previously announced principles can provide, the judicial perception
of facts is full and rich. The richer the description, the more generalized must be the word used to capture it. Consider, for example, the
Burger Court's statement of the plight of women who are unable to
obtain abortions:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty . . . or...
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment
that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct
harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon
the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm
may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed
by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
with the unwanted child . . . . In other cases . . . the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. °2
The constitutional value "privacy" announced in Roe v. Wade
emerged from this statement of facts; it did not organize the statement of those facts. It is as suggestive as the Court's statement was
sensitive and detailed. No wonder that the word "privacy" might be

101. The example used here, the right to privacy, has notoriously little if any relationship to constitutional text. But the argument applies to some degree whether or not the Court
attempts to tie its decision to constitutional text. When the Warren Court attempted to define
"state action" by close and full attention to the actual circumstances under which a semipublic restaurant operated, it succeeded only in exploding the meaning of "state action." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See the discussion in Greenawalt,
The EnduringSignificance of Neutral Principles,78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 988 (1978). When
a lower court defined "cruel and unusual punishment" by describing in horrible detail all of
the inadequacies of an Arkansas prison, the result was a greatly expanded and uncertain
meaning for that term. See note 23 supra. See generally Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions ofPrison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of
State Penal Administration Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. REV. 893 (1977).
There are, of course, other reasons for the tendency of constitutional values to take on expansive meanings. See Nagel, Book Review, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1174 (1979).
102. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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thought relevant to the harms visited upon minors who are unable to
obtain contraceptiVesloa or to the many harms and benefits controlled

by the institution of marriage. 10 4 Indeed, the term, as used by the
Court, might be thought relevant wherever personal anguish can be
found.

Once begun, the expansion of constitutional meaning is cumulative. As the meaning of one constitutional term becomes vague, the
context provided by that term for defining other constitutional words
is diminished. The term "procedural due process," for example, was
once relatively certain across a broad range of situations. The phrase
referred to an adversary model of decision-making and required such
traditional protections as adequate notice of charges, the opportunity
to confront witnesses and to present evidence, a decision based on
the evidence presented, and so forth.'0 5 The specifics might vary counsel might not always be required, for instance - but the basic
contours of an adversary hearing remained fairly clear. The effect of
this relatively certain meaning for the phrase "due process" was that
the Court could not require "due process" for every governmental
decision. Some discretionary decisions, being inappropriate for adversary hearings, had to be exempted from the requirements of due
process. This was achieved by holding that some interests did not
come within the concepts of "liberty" or "property," the deprivation
of which trigger due process requirements.10 6
More recently, the Court has defined "due process" contextually. Its meaning varies depending upon "the private interest that
will be affected . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . the
probable value, if any, of additional . . . procedural safeguards; and
"o107 In short, "due
. . . the [nature of the state's] interest ....
process" means a minimally adequate decision-making process under
the circumstances, or, as the Court phrases it, "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."' 1 8 It does not include
the right to cross-examine witnesses in the context of a prison disciplinary hearing. 1°9 In a school, it might amount merely to an "informal give-and-take" between student and principal."10 To permit the

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Id. at 334.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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shutting off of gas or electricity by a public utility, due process is
satisfied by notice reasonably designed to tell customers where they
can complain.'
Since "due process" has lost its denotive meaning, it is now potentially relevant to any type of governmental decision.", It might
apply to parole decisions that are largely discretionary," 3 to expulsion from medical school on academic grounds,"' or to the decision
of a parent to commit his child to a mental health facility." 5 Any
decision-making process can be evaluated to determine what "the
situation demands." And, of course, a court will do the evaluating.
CONCLUSION

Given the political and moral complexity of many of the issues
that the Burger Court has faced, the character of its constitutional
adjudication is not surprising. Indeed, narrow, apparently inconsistent decisions might be viewed as a largely unavoidable by-product
of the Justices' generally sensible approach to decision-making: pragmatic, flexible, and incremental. However, this cautious and uncertain use of doctrine tends to mitigate external political constraints on
the judiciary and - by shifting attention from principle to facts
to reduce internal intellectual constraints. The consequence is constitutional interpretation that increases both the detail and generality
of judicial regulation, thereby plunging the judiciary ever more
deeply into the kinds of intractable issues that yield so poorly to sustained agreement or to clear explanation. The style and rhetoric of
moderation are thus pushing the nation toward more pervasive reliance on judicial decision-making.

11. Memphis

Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. I (1978).

112. In recent due process cases, the Court has even evaluated the adequacy of the
decision-making procedure without first determining whether a "liberty" or "property" interest
was at stake. See notes 113-15 infra. The Court avoided the task of defining these constitutional terms by finding that the procedures were reasonable under the circumstances. At some
point, if the meaning of one term becomes sufficiently vague, it makes no difference at all what
related terms might mean.
113. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. !
(1979).

114.

Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).

115.

Parham v. J.L., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).

